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Abstract
n  False recognition occurs when people mistakenly claim that
a novel item is familiar. After studying lists of semantically
related words, healthy controls show extraordinarily high lev-
els of false recognition to nonstudied lures that are semantic
associates of study list words. In previous experiments, we
found that both Korsakoff and non-Korsakoff amnesic patients
show reduced levels of false recognition to semantic associates,
implying that the medial temporal/diencephalic structures that
are damaged in amnesic patients are involved in the encoding
and/or retrieval of information that underlies false recognition.
These data contrast with earlier results indicating greater false
recognition in Korsakoff amnesics than in control subjects. The
present experiment tests the hypothesis that greater or lesser
false recognition of semantic associates in amnesic patients,
relative to normal controls, can be demonstrated by creating
conditions that are more or less conducive to allowing true
recognition to suppress false recognition. With repeated pres-
entation and testing of lists of semantic associates, control
subjects and both Korsakoff and non-Korsakoff amnesics
showed increasing levels of true recognition across trials. How-
ever, control subjects exhibited decreasing levels of false rec-
ognition across trials, whereas Korsakoff amnesic patients
showed increases across trials and non-Korsakoff amnesics
showed a ºuctuating pattern. Consideration of signal detection
analyses and differences between the two types of amnesic
patients provides insight into how mechanisms of veridical
episodic memory can be used to suppress false recognition.  n
INTRODUCTION
Although memory is often accurate, it is also subject to
various kinds of errors and distortions (for recent re-
views, see Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Roedi-
ger, 1996; Schacter, 1995). Memory distortions are
important because they provide insights into the con-
structive nature of encoding and retrieval operations.
During the past several years, there has been growing
interest in the brain structures and processes that are
related to memory errors and distortions, as explored in
experiments with various patient populations (cf. Kroll,
Knight, Metcalfe, Wolf, & Tulving, 1996; Metcalfe, Funnell,
& Gazzaniga, 1995; Moscovitch, 1995; Parkin, Bin-
schaedler, Harsent, & Metzler, 1996; Reinitz, Verfaellie, &
Milberg, 1996; Schacter, Curran, Galluccio, Milberg, &
Bates, 1996) and in neuroimaging studies (Duzel, Yoneli-
nas, Mangun, Heinze, & Tulving, 1997; Johnson et al.,
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1997; Schacter, Buckner, Koutstaal, Dale, & Rosen, 1997;
Schacter, Reiman, et al., 1996; for review, see Schacter,
Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998).
One of the most extensively studied types of memory
distortions is known as false recognition. False recogni-
tion occurs when people claim incorrectly to have pre-
viously encountered a novel word, object, face, or event
that is in some way related to a studied item (Under-
wood, 1965). Recent experiments using a paradigm in-
itially developed by Deese (1959), and revived and
modiªed by Roediger and McDermott (1995; see also
Read, 1996), have demonstrated exceptionally high lev-
els of false recognition. After studying lists of semantic
associates that all converge on a nonpresented “theme
word,” participants frequently claim to remember the
nonpresented word (cf. Israel & Schacter, 1997; Mather,
Henkel, & Johnson, 1997; Norman & Schacter, 1997;
Payne, Elie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996; Robinson &
Roediger, 1997; Roediger & McDermott, 1995).To gain insight into the brain mechanisms underlying
this memory illusion, we have recently examined false
recognition in amnesic patients (Schacter, Verfaellie, &
Pradere, 1996; Schacter, Verfaellie, & Anes,1997). Amne-
sic patients exhibit severe difªculties remembering re-
cent experiences as a consequence of damage to the
medial regions of the temporal lobes and related struc-
tures in the diencephalon, yet retain normal perceptual
and linguistic functions along with IQ scores within the
normal range (Parkin & Leng, 1993; Squire, 1994). Schac-
ter, Curran, et al. (1996) exposed amnesics and matched
controls to lists of semantic associates (e.g., candy, sour,
sugar, bitter, good, taste, tooth, and so forth) and tested
them with previously studied words (e.g., taste), new
words that are semantically related to previously pre-
sented words (e.g., sweet ), and new words that are
unrelated to previously studied ones (e.g., point). As
expected, amnesic patients attained fewer hits to pre-
viously presented words and made more false alarms to
new unrelated words than did matched controls. But
amnesic patients also made signiªcantly fewer false
alarms to the nonpresented theme words than did con-
trols, who showed high levels of false recognition to
these words. In follow-up studies, we replicated this
ªnding of reduced false recognition for semantically
related words in amnesic patients and extended it to
perceptual false recognition, where new words are
physically, rather than conceptually, related to previously
studied words (Schacter, Verfaellie, et al., 1997).
The foregoing ªndings suggest that the medial tempo-
ral/diencephalic structures that are damaged in amnesic
patients play a role in storing and/or retrieving the se-
mantic (or perceptual) information that drives false rec-
ognition in healthy controls. However, as noted by
Schacter, Verfaellie, et al. (1996) and Schacter, Verfaellie,
et al. (1997), our ªndings contrast with an older study of
false recognition in amnesic patients reported by Cer-
mak, Butters, and Gerrein (1973). In their experiment,
new words were preceded by a single homophone,
associate, or synonym. A continuous recognition proce-
dure was used in which new and old words were inter-
mixed and subjects responded “old” or “new” to each
test item (there was no separate study list prior to the
recognition test as there was in our experiments and in
the other reviewed studies). In contrast to the results of
our experiments, however, amnesic patients showed a
higher overall level of false recognition than did controls
(this result was attributable to false recognition of homo-
phones and associates; for reasons that are unclear, nei-
ther amnesics nor controls in this experiment showed
signiªcant false recognition to synonyms).
To account for the sharp contrast between the Cer-
mak et al. (1973) results and those of Schacter, Verfaellie,
et al. (1996) and Schacter, Verfaellie, et al. (1997), we
suggested that when numerous associates are presented
during study (as in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott para-
digm), normal controls establish a well-organized repre-
sentation of the semantic or perceptual gist (Reyna &
Brainerd, 1995) of the study list; when this repre-
sentation is matched by a new theme word, normal
controls experience a strong sense of familiarity or rec-
ollection that produces a robust false recognition effect.
Amnesic patients, by contrast, encode or retain less gist
information and hence show reduced levels of false
recognition. However, when only a single related item
precedes a new word, as in Cermak et al.’s study, con-
trols establish a less robust gist representation than
when numerous associates are studied, and they can use
their intact explicit memory abilities to suppress or op-
pose (Jacoby, 1991) the sense of familiarity or recollec-
tion they may experience when encountering a related
new word. Thus, for example, a nonamnesic individual
who encounters the nonstudied word table and can
recollect having previously studied the associate chair
and can use this information to avoid making a false
recognition response (Brainerd, Reyna, & Kneer, 1995).
Amnesic patients, however, might be less able to use
recollection to oppose or suppress whatever weak sense
of familiarity or recollection is engendered by a new
theme word and, therefore, exhibit increased levels of
false recognition compared to nonamnesic controls.
According to this analysis, it should be possible to
show, within a single experiment, greater or lesser false
recognition in amnesic patients relative to normal con-
trols by creating conditions that are more or less condu-
cive to using explicit recollection to suppress false
recognition. Note, however, that the Cermak et al. (1973)
paper included only alcoholic Korsakoff amnesic pa-
tients. More recent research has shown that Korsakoff
patients are characterized by cognitive deªcits that are
not observed in non-Korsakoff amnesics and that are
likely related to frontal lobe damage (cf. Moscovitch,
1982; Schacter, 1987; Shimamura, 1995; Squire, 1982).
Thus, it is possible that impairments in the ability to
suppress false recognition may be present only in Kor-
sakoff patients or that such impairments may be exacer-
bated in these patients. In our previous studies of false
recognition (Schacter, Verfaellie, et al., 1996; Schacter,
Verfaellie, et al., 1997), Korsakoff and non-Korsakoff am-
nesics (i.e., anoxic and encephalitic patients with medial
temporal lobe damage) have performed similarly, with
both subgroups of amnesic patients exhibiting impaired
true recognition and reduced false recognition of related
lures compared to appropriate control subjects. How-
ever, it is entirely conceivable that the contrasting pat-
tern found in the Cermak et al. (1973) study—increased
false recognition in amnesics compared to controls—
could be attributable to cognitive deªcits that are unique
to Korsakoff patients.
In the present experiment, we tested these ideas by
repeatedly presenting amnesic patients and matched
controls with the same study lists of semantic associates
and repeatedly testing them with lists comprised of
previously studied words, semantically related lures, and
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lists of words, were given a recognition test, studied the
same six lists again, were given a second recognition test,
and continued this sequence for a total of ªve study-test
trials. We suggest that with repeated study and testing of
the same lists, (1) normal controls would show increas-
ing explicit recollection of previously presented words,
and (2) they would use this episodic memory to reduce
false alarms to related words that were not presented.
Consistent with these suggestions, in a study of false
recall by McDermott (1996), participants studied and
recalled the same lists of semantic associates across ªve
study-test trials. Free recall of studied words increased
systematically across trials, whereas false recall (i.e., in-
trusions) of semantically related lures decreased system-
atically across trials.
We hypothesize that healthy controls will show a
similar pattern on a recognition test, with true recogni-
tion of previously studied words increasing, and false
recognition of semantic associates decreasing, across
study-test trials. By contrast, we hypothesize a different
pattern of results in amnesic patients. Based on our
previous results (Schacter, Verfaellie, et al., 1996; Schacter,
Verfaellie, et al., 1997), we expect that both Korsakoff
and non-Korsakoff amnesic patients will show reduced
levels of both true and false recognition compared to
controls on the ªrst study-test trial. We also expect that
with repetition of study-test lists, both Korsakoff and
non-Korsakoff amnesic patients will continue to show
impaired levels of veridical recognition memory com-
pared to controls, although (like controls) they should
show some increases in true recognition across trials.
Most important, in contrast to the control group, we
hypothesize that both Korsakoff and non-Korsakoff am-
nesic patients’ impoverished veridical recollections will
prevent them from using episodic memory to reduce
false recognition across trials. That is, even though we
expect that amnesic patients will show increases in true
recognition across trials, we hypothesize that these in-
creases will not be sufªcient to allow amnesic patients
to suppress false recognition to the same degree as
control subjects do. Our reasoning here is based on our
previous suggestion that both true and false recognition
performance of amnesic patients in the Deese/Roediger-
McDermott paradigm is based largely on a degraded
representation of the semantic gist of the study list
(Brainerd et al., 1995), with little or no contribution from
speciªc recollections of particular studied items. As
noted earlier, we assume that suppression of false recog-
nition is facilitated by speciªc recollections of the prior
occurrence of studied items. If repetition of studied
items serves mainly to strengthen a semantic gist repre-
sentation in amnesic patients, but also strengthens spe-
ciªc recollections of particular studied items in controls,
amnesic patients will be less able to use increasing true
recognition to suppress false recognition.
The aforementioned differences between Korsakoff
and non-Korsakoff amnesic patients are also important
to consider here. It is possible that suppression of false
recognition requires the intact functioning of veriªca-
tion and control mechanisms, dependent on frontal lobe
structures (cf. Schacter, Curran, et al., 1996; Shallice, 1988;
Shimamura, 1995), which may be impaired in Korsakoff
but not non-Korsakoff amnesics. Such cognitive impair-
ments, together with impaired episodic recollection, may
have contributed to the previously mentioned ªnding
from Cermak et al. (1973) that Korsakoff patients
showed higher levels of false recognition than did con-
trols. If so, the expected ªnding of reduced false recog-
nition on the ªrst study-test trial in Korsakoff patients
compared to controls should be reversed across trials,
with Korsakoff patients eventually showing more false
recognition than their controls. It is less clear whether
such a crossover will be observed in non-Korsakoff pa-
tients, where any difªculties suppressing false recogni-
tion are likely attributable solely to deªcits in episodic
recollection.
RESULTS
Figure 1 displays the proportions of “old” responses to
(1) previously studied words, (2) related lures that are
semantic associates of previously studied words, and (3)
unrelated lures that are not associates of previously stud-
ied words. These results are shown separately for each
of the amnesic subgroups and their respective controls.
Preliminary analyses revealed no signiªcant differences
between the two amnesic subgroups for true recogni-
tion, so we present statistical analyses of these data
collapsed across the two amnesic subgroups. There were,
however, some signiªcant differences between the two
subgroups for false recognition, so we analyze these data
separately for Korsakoff amnesics and mixed amnesics.
Following these analyses of overall recognition perfor-
mance, we present signal detection analyses that provide
estimates of sensitivity (A¢) and bias (BD²) for several key
comparisons (Table 1).
True Recognition
Consider ªrst analyses of the initial test trial. Compared
to the control group, amnesic patients made signiªcantly
fewer old responses to studied words (0.64 versus 0.84;
t(22) = 3.00, p < 0.01) and signiªcantly more old re-
sponses to unrelated lures (0.26 vs. 0.05; t(22) = 4.07,
p < 0.001). Analyses of corrected recognition scores that
were obtained by subtracting the proportion of old re-
sponses to unrelated lures from the proportion of old
responses to studied words reveal that amnesic patients
exhibit signiªcantly reduced levels of recognition accu-
racy, (0.38 versus 0.79; t(22) = 5.44, p < 0.001).
Consideration of all ªve test trials indicates that true
recognition was affected similarly by study-test repeti-
tions in amnesics and controls. Repetition of study-test
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of old responses to studied words made by both amne-
sics and controls. An analysis of variance (ANOVA) on
these responses that included Group as a between-
subjects variable and Trials as a within-subjects variable
shows highly signiªcant effects of Group, F(1, 22) =
17.92,  MSE = 0.054, p < 0.001 and Trials, F(4, 88) = 10.66,
MSE = 0.009, p < 0.0001, together with a nonsigniªcant
Group ´ Trials interaction (F < 1). The proportion of old
responses to unrelated lures did not change signiªcantly
across trials in either group (note, however, that ºoor
effects were operative for controls): an ANOVA yielded
a signiªcant effect of Group F(1, 22) = 16.88, MSE =
0.079, p < 0.001, together with nonsigniªcant effects of
Trials, F(4, 88) = 1.03, MSE = 0.010, and Group ´  Trials,
Fs < 1. Analyses of corrected recognition scores show
main effects of Group, F(1, 22) = 44.65, MSE = 0.103,
p  < 0.0001, and Trials F(4, 88) = 12.76, MSE = 0.013, p <
0.0001, and a nonsigniªcant effect of Group ´ Trials,
F < 1.
False Recognition
Combined across the two patient subgroups, amnesic
patients made signiªcantly fewer old responses to re-
lated lures than did controls (0.60 vs. 0.83; t(22) = 2.54,
p < 0.05), and showed signiªcantly reduced levels of
corrected false recognition (0.34 vs. 0.78; t(22) = 4.78,
p < 0.001). Separate analyses of the two patient sub-
groups indicate that Korsakoff amnesic patients made
signiªcantly fewer old responses to related lures than
did alcoholic controls (0.50 vs. 89; t(22) = 2.91, p < 0.01).
Compared to their controls, Korsakoff patients also
showed a signiªcantly lower level of corrected false
recognition (0.22 vs. 0.83; t(22) = 5.31, p < 0.001), which
was obtained by subtracting false alarms to unrelated
Figure 1. Proportions of old responses to studied words (Panels A and C), related lures (Panels B and D), and unrelated lures (Panels A-D) in
the two subgroups of amnesics (Korsakoff and mixed) and their respective control groups (alcoholic and nonalcoholic) as a function of study-
test trial. Korsakoff and mixed amnesics showed similarly impaired true recognition. However, Korsakoff patients showed increasing false recog-
nition across trials, whereas mixed amnesics showed a ºuctuating pattern across trials.
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made numerically fewer old responses to related lures
than did their controls (0.69 vs. 0.78), but the difference
was not signiªcant, t < 1. However, mixed amnesics did
show signiªcantly lower levels of corrected false recog-
nition than did their controls, (0.46 vs. 0.83; t(22) = 2.06,
p < 0.05). Thus, the overall pattern of ªrst trial data is
generally consistent with our previous ªndings of re-
duced false recognition in both amnesic subgroups
(Schacter, Verfaellie, et al., 1996; Schacter, Verfaellie, et al.,
1997).
Consideration of all ªve test trials (Figure 1) indicates
that Korsakoff patients showed steadily increasing levels
of false recognition across trials, resulting in a crossover
interaction with the alcoholic control group: Korsakoff
patients showed lower levels of false recognition than
alcoholic controls on the ªrst trial and higher levels of
false recognition on the ªnal trial. Mixed amnesics
showed ºuctuating levels of false recognition across tri-
als, contrasting with consistent decreases shown by non-
alcoholic controls, also producing a crossover between
the ªrst and ªnal trials.
ANOVAs on overall false recognition responses and
corrected false recognition responses that compared
Korsakoff patients to alcoholic controls each showed
signiªcant Group ´ Trials interactions, Fs(1, 40) > 3.65,
ps < 0.02. Comparisons between mixed amnesics and
their controls also reveal Group ´ Trials interactions for
overall false recognition and corrected false recognition,
Fs(1, 40) > 2.87, ps < 0.05. Direct comparisons between
mixed amnesics and Korsakoff patients also show a sig-
niªcant Group ´ Trials interaction for overall false recog-
nition, F(1, 40) = 4.31, p < 0.01, and a trend toward such
an interaction for corrected false recognition, F(1, 40) =
2.12, p = 0.096.
To explore further the nature of changes in false
recognition across trials, we conducted linear trend analy-
ses on overall false recognition scores and corrected
false recognition scores (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985). An
ANOVA comparing Korsakoff patients and alcoholic con-
trols showed signiªcant Groups ´ Trials interactions for
both overall and corrected false recognition, Fs(1, 40) >
13.26, p < 0.001, indicating that the slopes of the two
groups differed. The Korsakoff patients showed a sig-
Table 1.  Signal Detection Analyses of Sensitivity (A¢ and Bias (BD²) as a Function of Study-Test Trials in Korsakoff Amnesics,
Alcoholic Controls, Mixed Amnesics, and Nonalcoholic Controls
Korsakoff amnesics Alcoholic controls Mixed amnesics
Nonalcoholic
controls
Trials A¢ BD² A¢ BD² A¢ BD² A¢ BD²
Item-Speciªc Memory (Hits Compared to Novel False Alarms)
1  0.77  0.07  0.91  0.39  0.73  0.20  0.93  0.44
2  0.84  0.19  0.95  0.27  0.77  0.03  0.95  0.09
3  0.86 -0.02  0.97  0.32  0.86  0.13  0.97  0.32
4  0.83 -0.13  0.96  0.41  0.83  0.27  0.97  0.32
5  0.82 -0.24  0.97  0.32  0.86  0.32  0.96  0.46
Item-Speciªc Memory (Hits Compared to Related False Alarms)
1  0.65 -0.29  0.46 -0.73  0.42 -0.38  0.57 -0.68
2  0.61 -0.31  0.57 -0.77  0.65 -0.37  0.74 -0.81
3  0.50 -0.67  0.66 -0.95  0.50 -0.56  0.81 -0.80
4  0.54 -0.72  0.66 -0.78  0.64 -0.07  0.81 -0.80
5  0.47 -0.76  0.69 -0.89  0.59 -0.48  0.78 -0.63
Gist Memory (Related False Alarms Compared to Novel False Alarms)
1  0.66  0.10  0.93  0.36  0.78  0.14  0.90  0.58
2  0.76  0.31  0.92  0.45  0.70  0.33  0.86  0.55
3  0.86 -0.08  0.93  0.63  0.86  0.12  0.85  0.87
4  0.81 -0.11  0.90  0.74  0.72  0.24  0.84  0.84
5  0.85 -0.26  0.90  0.67  0.83  0.40  0.84  0.84
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corrected false recognition, Fs(1, 20) > 12.19, p < 0.005,
whereas alcoholic controls showed a signiªcant linear
decrease for overall false recognition, F(1, 20) = 4.39,
p < 0.05, and a nonsigniªcant trend for a decrease in
corrected false recognition, F(1, 20) = 1.75. An ANOVA
comparing mixed amnesics and healthy controls showed
signiªcant Group ´ Trials interactions for both overall
and corrected false recognition, Fs(1, 40) > 4.58, p <
0.05, conªrming that the slopes of mixed amnesics and
their controls differed. Healthy controls showed a sig-
niªcant linear decrease in both analyses, Fs(1, 20) >
11.64, ps < 0.005, whereas mixed amnesic showed no
evidence of a linear trend, Fs < 1.
Signal Detection Analyses
To determine whether the main ªndings of the experi-
ment are attributable to changes in sensitivity or re-
sponse bias, we performed signal detection analyses that
have been described and applied to similar kinds of true
versus false recognition data by Koutstaal and Schacter
(1997) and Tussing and Greene (1998), using A¢ as an
estimate of sensitivity and BD² as an estimate of response
bias (Donaldson, 1993; Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Val-
ues of A¢ can vary between 0 and 1.00; higher values
indicate greater sensitivity, with 0.50 indicating chance
performance. Values of the bias measure, BD², can vary
between  -1.00 (indicating extremely liberal responding)
and +1.00 (indicating extremely conservative respond-
ing). Because these measures are undeªned with hit
rates of 0 or 1, the data were ªrst transformed, as rec-
ommended by Snodgrass and Corwin, by computing
p(x) as (x + 0.5)/n + 1 rather than x/n. In addition,
when individual subjects showed below chance sensitiv-
ity (hits < false alarms, or A¢ < 0.50), modiªed formulas
provided by Aaronsen and Watts (1987) were used.
Following Koutstaal and Schacter (1997), we provide
three different types of signal detection analyses, shown
in the upper, middle, and lower panels of Table 1. The
uppermost panel of Table 1 shows estimates of sensitiv-
ity and bias comparing hits (i.e., old responses to studied
items) with false alarms to unrelated lures, which consti-
tutes a measure of item-speciªc true recognition (re-
ferred to as A¢ unrelated and BD² unrelated for sensitivity
and bias, respectively). The middle panel compares hits
with false alarms to related lures, which provides a dif-
ferent measure of item-speciªc true recognition (A¢ re-
lated and BD² related for sensitivity and bias,
respectively). In the bottom panel of Table 1, false alarms
to related lures are depicted as a form of memory for
the “gist” of the study list (cf. Brainerd et al., 1995;
Koutstaal & Schacter, 1997) and thus are treated in the
same manner as hits in the previous two analyses. For
this analysis, false alarms to related lures are compared
to false alarms to unrelated lures; A¢ indicates the extent
to which subjects called related lures old compared to
how often they called unrelated lures old. We call these
measures of sensitivity and bias A¢ gist and BD² gist,
respectively.
Item-Speciªc Memory (Hits Compared to Unrelated
Lure False Alarms)
Table 1 shows that, not surprisingly, A¢ unrelated was
consistently higher in both groups of controls than in
Korsakoff and mixed amnesics, reºecting a greater ability
for controls than amnesics to distinguish between stud-
ied words and unrelated lures. A¢ unrelated increased
across trials for all groups, reaching near-ceiling levels for
controls. Because there were no signiªcant subgroup
differences for this analysis, an ANOVA was performed
on data from the entire group of amnesics and controls.
This analysis revealed signiªcant main effects for Group,
F(1, 22) = 28.29, MSE = 0.020, p < 0.0001, and Trials, F(4,
88) = 6.54, MSE = 0.004, p < 0.0001, along with a
nonsigniªcant effect of Group ´ Trials, F < 1. The bias
measure, BD² unrelated, indicates moderately conserva-
tive responding on the part of both groups. An ANOVA
failed to reveal signiªcant effects of Group or Trials,
although there was a slight trend for more conservative
responding on the part of controls (for Group, F(1,  22) =
2.45, MSE = 0.763, p = 0.132; other Fs < 1).
Item-Speciªc Memory (Hits Compared to Related
Lure False Alarms)
The A¢ related values in the middle panel of Table 1
reºect the extent to which participants distinguish be-
tween studied words and related lures. Perhaps the most
notable feature of these data is that nonalcoholic con-
trols, alcoholic controls, and mixed amnesics all show
trends for increasing A¢ related across trials, whereas
Korsakoff patients show the opposite effect. An ANOVA
comparing Korsakoff patients and alcoholic controls re-
vealed a signiªcant Group ´ Trials interaction, F(4, 40) =
3.94, p < 0.01. A comparison between mixed amnesics
and nonalcoholic controls documented signiªcant ef-
fects of Group, F(1, 10) = 10.76, p < 0.01, indicating that
mixed amnesics had greater difªculty distinguishing be-
tween studied words and related lures than did controls
across all trials; there was also a signiªcant effect of Trials,
F(4, 40) = 6.13, p < 0.001, and a nonsigniªcant effect of
Group ´ Trials, F < 1.
The values of BD² related in the middle panel of Table
1 indicate that when old responses to related lures are
treated as false alarms, all groups respond quite liberally,
with each group of controls tending to respond more
liberally than either group of amnesic patients, Fs(1,
10) < 4.01, p < 0.08. Korsakoff patients showed a mar-
ginally signiªcant tendency to respond more liberally
across trials, F(4, 20) = 2.75, p = 0.057, whereas each of
the other groups showed ºuctuating patterns.
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to Unrelated Lure False Alarms)
A¢ gist, shown in the lower panel of Table 1, does not
necessarily indicate the amount of gist memory available
to subjects but rather reºects their tendency to rely on
gist despite any opposing inºuence of item-speciªc
memory. As can be seen in Table 1, the most marked
effects for A¢ gist are seen in the Korsakoff patients.
Levels of A¢ gist were generally lower in Korsakoff pa-
tients than in alcoholic controls. But in the Korsakoff
patients, A¢ gist increased substantially across trials, F(4,
20) = 5.96, p < 0.01, whereas A¢ gist showed slight but
nonsigniªcant decreases across trials in alcoholic con-
trols, F < 1. An ANOVA comparing the two groups re-
vealed signiªcant main effects of Group, F(1, 10) = 10.11,
p < 0.01, and Trials, F(4, 40) = 4.06, p < 0.01, and most
important, a signiªcant Group ´ Trials interaction, F(4,
40) = 5.02, p < 0.01.
In mixed amnesic patients, A¢ gist showed a ºuctuating
pattern, with nonsigniªcant changes across trials, F(4,
20) = 2.14, whereas nonalcoholic controls showed a
nonsigniªcant trend for decreasing A¢ gist across trials,
F(4, 20) = 1.86. Mixed amnesics showed somewhat
lower levels of A¢ gist than did nonalcoholic controls on
the early trials that were not evident on the ªnal trial; a
combined ANOVA revealed trends toward effects of
Group,  F(1, 10) = 3.49, p = 0.091, Trial, F(4, 40) = 2.12,
p = 0.096, and Group ´ Trial, F(4, 40) = 2.09, p = 0.10.
BD² in this analysis was generally lower in Korsakoff
patients than in alcoholic controls, F(1, 10) = 4.71, p =
0.055, indicating more liberal responding on the basis of
gist in the Korsakoff group. There was also a signiªcant
Group ´ Trials interaction, F(4, 40) = 2.89, p < 0.05,
which reºects nonsigniªcant trends for decreasing BD²
across trials in Korsakoff patients, F(4, 20) = 1.57, to-
gether with trends for increases across trials in alcoholic
controls, F(4, 20) = 1.94. BD² was also somewhat lower
in mixed amnesics than in nonalcoholic controls, F(1,
10) = 3.47, p = 0.09. BD² increased signiªcantly across
trials in nonalcoholic controls, F(4, 20) = 3.16, p < 0.05,
indicating increasingly conservative responding, whereas
BD² did not change across trials in mixed amnesics, F <
1. However, the Group ´ Trial interaction was not sig-
niªcant, F(4, 40) = 1.63.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In previous research, we (Schacter, Verfaellie, et al., 1996;
Schacter, Verfaellie, et al., 1997) found that amnesic pa-
tients show reduced false recognition of semantic asso-
ciates in a paradigm that yields high levels of false
recognition in healthy controls. The present experiment
has extended this work and related it to earlier research
showing increased false recognition in Korsakoff amne-
sics (Cermak et al., 1973) by demonstrating different
patterns of false recognition suppression in both Korsa-
koff and non-Korsakoff amnesic patients compared to
matched controls. Analysis of results from the ªrst trial
conªrmed results of Schacter, Verfaellie, et al. In addition
to showing impaired levels of true recognition for stud-
ied words, both subgroups of amnesic patients showed
substantially reduced levels of corrected false recogni-
tion compared to controls.
Across trials, true recognition of studied words in-
creased in all groups, whereas false recognition of re-
lated lures decreased signiªcantly in the nonalcoholic
controls and showed similar trends in alcoholic controls.
In contrast, mixed amnesic patients showed ºuctuating
levels of false recognition across trials, whereas Korsa-
koff patients showed clear and consistent evidence for
increasing levels of false recognition across trials. Signal
detection analyses indicated that across trials, control
subjects showed relatively constant levels of sensitivity
to gist and used increasingly conservative response cri-
teria to related versus unrelated lures; changes in re-
sponse criteria were most evident in nonalcoholic
controls. Korsakoff patients, by contrast, used relatively
constant response criteria for related versus unrelated
lures across trials but showed increasing sensitivity to
gist inºuences, whereas mixed amnesic patients failed to
show signiªcant changes in either sensitivity to gist or
in the response critiera used to respond to related versus
unrelated lures.
The increasing sensitivity to gist inºuences seen in
Korsakoff patients indicates that repeated study and test-
ing of semantic associates creates an increasingly robust
representation of semantic gist that, when entirely un-
checked by veridical memory, produces increasingly ele-
vated levels of false recognition. Repeated study and
testing also presumably lead to an increasingly robust
gist representation in control subjects, but they can
make use of explicit recollection to employ increasingly
conservative response criteria that serve to counteract
or suppress the strengthening gist representation. These
observations are consistent with our earlier suggestion
that the contrasting results obtained in previous stud-
ies—Korsakoff amnesics showing increased false recog-
nition in the continous recognition experiments of
Cermak et al. (1973), where related lures are preceded
by only a single associate, and decreased false recogni-
tion in our recent experiments (Schacter, Verfaellie, et al.,
1996; Schacter, Verfaellie, et al., 1996), where related
lures are preceded by numerous associates—reºect the
differential operation in these two paradigms of mecha-
nisms for suppressing false recognition.
Although the mixed amnesic group did not show
reliable reductions of false recognition across trials, the
fact that false recognition did not increase signiªcantly
across trials in these patients suggests that mixed amne-
sics were at least partially able to suppress the strength-
ening gist inºuence. The observed difference in
suppression of false recognition between the two amne-
sic subgroups is unlikely to be related to severity of
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amnesics (m = 57.3) are similar to those in the mixed
amnesics (m = 58.8; see Table 2). Morever, in the present
experiment the true recognition scores of Korsakoff
patients were actually somewhat higher than those of
mixed amnesics on the ªrst trial (corrected recognition
scores were 0.50 and 0.39 for Korsakoff patients and
mixed amnesics, respectively). Note also, however, that
by the ªfth trial, corrected true recognition scores of
mixed amnesic patients (0.67) were higher than those
of Korsakoff patients (0.59). These ªndings suggest that
the veridical recognition of Korsakoff patients failed to
beneªt from study-test trials to the same extent as the
veridical recognition of the mixed amnesics.
Because the ªrst trial data undermine any simple in-
terpretation in terms of severity of amnesia, it is likely
that previously mentioned cognitive deªcits that are
unique to Korsakoff patients, and that may be related to
frontal lobe damage (cf. Moscovitch, 1982; Schacter,
1987; Shimamura, 1995; Squire, 1982), contribute to Kor-
sakoff patients’ severely impaired ability to suppress the
strengthening across-trial inºuence of semantic gist. Con-
sistent with this possibility, damage to the frontal lobes
has been linked recently with high levels of false recog-
nition (Parkin et al., 1996; Schacter, Verfaellie, et al.,
1996). Moreover, a number of neuroimaging studies have
strongly implicated various regions within the frontal
lobes in episodic memory (cf., Buckner, Petersen, Oje-
mann, Miezin, Squire, & Raichle, 1995; Nyberg et al., 1995;
Schacter, Alpert, Savage, Rauch, & Albert, 1996; Shallice,
Fletcher, Frith, Grasby, Frackowiak, & Dolan, 1994; Tul-
ving, Kapur, Craik, Moscovitch, & Houle, 1994). Recent
evidence suggests that activity within anterior prefrontal
regions may be speciªcally related to postretrieval moni-
toring and veriªcation processes (Rugg, Fletcher, Frith,
Frackowiack, & Dolan, 1996; Schacter, Buckner, et al.,
1997; Schacter, Reiman, et al., 1996; Wilding & Rugg,
1996). Such processes, which may be related to the
inhibitory functions of the frontal lobes (Shimamura,
1995), would presumably be required to use episodic
information to suppress false recognition and are likely
impaired in Korsakoff patients.
An alternative possibility is that deªcits in source
memory, commonly seen in patients with frontal lobe
damage (Janowsky, Shimamura, & Squire, 1989; Schacter,
Harbluk, & McLachlan, 1984), are implicated in the ef-
fects we observed. Because items were repeatedly pre-
sented and tested across trials, the ability to discriminate
studied items from related lures required consideration
of their source: On later trials, both studied items and
related lures had been previously encountered, but re-
lated lures—in contrast to studied items—were pre-
sented only on earlier test lists (and not on earlier study
lists). Perhaps Korsakoff patients had particular difªculty
Table 2. Characteristics of Korsakoff and Mixed Amnesics Patients
WMS-R
Patient Etiology Age ED VIQ GM DLY ATN
R.D. Korsakoff 67 12  83  66 50  99
W.R. Korsakoff 69  7  88  76 53  96
R.M. Korsakoff 77 14 112  91 68  95
L.B. Korsakoff 63 11  90  99 61  99
A.A. Korsakoff 70  9  93  76 62 109
C.G. Korsakoff 59 12  89  62 50  91
Mean 67.5 10.8  92.5 78.3 57.3  98.2
P.S. anoxia 39 14  95  90 50 115
D.F. encephalitis 47 16 111  81 69 107
J.M. anoxia 47 12  89  70 52  95
P.D. anoxia 60 20 109  65 61  89
S.S. encephalitis 69 18 126 102 50 114
C.W. anoxia 39 12 104  88 71 108
Mean 50.2 15.3 105.7 82.7 58.8 104.7
Note: ED = years of formal education. VIQ = Verbal IQ from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Revised). WMS-R = Wechsler Memory Scale—
Revised; scores are presented separately for the indices of general memory (GM), delay (DLY), and attention (ATN). The WMS-R does not pro-
vide scores below 50, and 50 was the lowest score used to compute means.
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study or a test list (cf. Parkin, Leng, & Hunkin, 1990, for
a similar ªnding).
We cannot distinguish between the two foregoing
possibilities deªnitively, but one feature of our results
calls into question the idea that source memory is criti-
cally important for suppression of false recognition in
our paradigm. If healthy controls used intact source
memory abilities to suppress false recognition by recol-
lecting correctly that they encountered related lures on
prior tests and not on study lists, suppression of false
recognition should have been expressed in our signal
detection analyses primarily by changes in A¢ gist; that is,
controls should have been able to selectively reduce old
responses to related lures. Although there were some
trends in this direction, the data indicate that suppres-
sion was expressed mainly through the use of a more
conservative criterion, perhaps reºecting intact veriªca-
tion processes or inhibitory functions. Future studies
could examine the roles of veriªcation/inhibition mecha-
nisms on the one hand and study-test source confusions
on the other, with a modiªed paradigm in which repeat-
edly studied sets of semantic associates and their related
lure words are not tested repeatedly; estimates of ªrst-
trial performance could be obtained on a different set of
items that is not presented again for study or for test. If
impaired veriªcation/inhibition mechanisms are respon-
sible for the effects we observed in Korsakoff patients,
Korsakoff patients should show the same pattern of
increasing false recognition observed here; if the effects
we observed are attributable to source confusions, Kor-
sakoff patients should not show increasing false recog-
nition in the modiªed paradigm.
Although the across-trial increases in false recognition
exhibited by Korsakoff patients are perhaps the most
dramatic effects in our experiment, the fact that mixed
amnesic patients showed signiªcantly less suppression
of false recognition than did nonalcoholic controls indi-
cates that impaired suppression of false recognition is
not produced entirely by cognitive impairments that are
unique to Korsakoff patients. Rather, these data suggest
that poor episodic memory also contributes to impaired
suppression of false recognition: the relative inability of
both mixed amnesic patients and Korsakoff patients to
remember which words had been presented reduces
their ability to remember which words had not been
presented. Consistent with this suggestion, Israel and
Schacter (1997) found that college students who studied
semantic associates that were each paired with a distinc-
tive picture, which increased the accuracy of veridical
recognition, later showed signiªcantly fewer false recog-
nition responses than did subjects who studied semantic
associates without accompanying pictures.
If normal controls used their increasing veridical epi-
sodic memory to reduce false recognition, why did in-
creasing across-trial memory for studied words produce
different effects on false recognition in amnesic patients?
As noted earlier, both subgroups of amnesic patients
showed increases in true recognition across trials that
were comparable to those observed in the two control
groups. Consider ªrst the Korsakoff patients. To the ex-
tent that failure of suppression is produced in part by
impairments that are distinct from poor veridical recog-
nition memory, it is not surprising that increasing veridi-
cal memory is not sufªcient to yield suppression of false
recognition: Impaired veriªcation/control mechanisms,
or poor source memory, do not allow Korsakoff patients
to use veridical memories to suppress false recognition.
The foregoing considerations do not account for our
ªnding that mixed amnesic patients failed to show sig-
niªcant suppression effects. We suggest that veridical
recognition in mixed amnesic patients (and Korsakoff
patients) is simply too impoverished to support suppres-
sion of false recognition. As noted in the “Introduction,”
we have argued previously that for amnesic patients, true
recognition in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott paradigm
is based largely or entirely on a degraded representation
of the semantic gist of the study list. Relevant evidence
from the present experiment comes from the ªnding
that A¢ related—the ability to distinguish previously stud-
ied items from related lures—was signiªcantly greater in
both groups of controls than in each of the amnesic
groups. Moreover, even though true recognition in-
creased across trials in both groups of amnesic patients,
ªfth trial recognition accuracy was still considerably
lower in each amnesic subgroup than ªrst trial recogni-
tion accuracy in either control group. It is possible that
with further repetition of study lists or other manipula-
tions, episodic memory in the amnesic patients could be
brought to a high enough level to produce signiªcant
suppression of false recognition. At very high levels of
recognition performance, amnesic patients may have
sufªciently detailed item-speciªc recollections (as op-
posed to degraded gist representations) that allow them
to successfully suppress false recognition. Based on the
present results, we would expect such effects to be most
pronounced in mixed amnesic patients, where failures
to show normal suppression are probably attributable to
poor episodic memory; that is, we would predict that
simply raising levels of veridical recognition in mixed
amnesic patients to the level of control subjects would
allow them to exhibit normal suppression of false recog-
nition. By contrast, we would not expect to observe such
a pattern with the Korsakoff patients: If both cognitive
impairments and poor episodic recognition contribute
to the observed patterns of increasing false recognition
observed in Korsakoff patients, even with higher levels
of veridical recognition, such patients may still fail to
show normal suppression effects.
The present data add to a growing list of experimental
situations in which the encoding of speciªc information
that guides veridical episodic memory induces nonam-
nesic subjects to adopt conservative response criteria
that help to suppress false recognition (see Miller &
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and false recognition). This outcome was observed in
Israel and Schacter’s (1997) study of pictorial encoding,
where encoding distinctive pictures was associated with
the adoption of conservative response criteria and re-
duced false recognition. Curran, Schacter, Norman, and
Galluccio (1997) reported something similar in a patient
with a right frontal lobe lesion, BG, who exhibits excep-
tionally high levels of false recognition: When induced
to engage in elaborative encoding of target materials, BG
used more conservative response criteria and showed
reduced false recognition.
After considering similar ªndings in the context of
cognitive aging, Schacter, Koutstaal, and Norman (1997)
argued that future studies of false memory processes
should focus on interactions between encoding and re-
trieval processes. Although this is a familiar theme in the
study of veridical recollections (Tulving & Thomson,
1973), it has not yet been applied systematically to false
recognition; Schacter et al. (1998) have sketched a theo-
retical framework that attempts to specify some of the
relevant components. Our results encourage such an
approach, which could be usefully applied to different
patient populations in which false recognition has been
observed (e.g., Metcalfe et al.,1995), new experimental
paradigms for producing the phenomenon (e.g., Kout-
staal & Schacter, 1997; Miller & Gazzaniga, in press), and
neuroimaging techniques for examining the brain activ-
ity that underlies the various manifestations of false rec-
ognition (Duzel et al., 1997; Johnson et al., 1997;
Schacter, Reiman, et al., 1996; Schacter, Buckner, et al.,
1997). Experimental paradigms such as the one we have
introduced here, along with related paradigms that place
different types of memory processes in opposition (Ja-
coby, 1991), provide a useful means for decomposing
and understanding the dynamic interplay of psychologi-
cal and biological processes that contribute to both
accuracy and inaccuracy in memory performance.
METHOD
Subjects
Twelve amnesic patients (8 males, 4 females) and 12
individuals with intact memory functioning (controls; 9
males, 3 females) participated in the experiment. The
amnesic patients and controls had all been screened at
the Memory Disorders Research Center of the Boston
VAMC (for details concerning individual patients, see
Schacter, Verfaellie, et al., 1996). Six patients had a diag-
nosis of alcoholic Korsakoff syndrome and six patients
had nonalcoholic etiologies (anoxia and encephalitis).
This combined group of amnesics had a mean age of
58.8 years and a mean of 13.1 years of education. The
amnesics were matched with 12 control subjects (6 with
a history of alcoholism and 6 without a history of alco-
holism) on the basis of age (mean = 56.8 years) and
education (mean = 13.5 years; both ts < 1). The amnesic
patients’ mean verbal IQ score as measured by the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R) was
99, which did not differ from that of the control subjects
(VIQ = 105), t(22) = 1.10. The patients’ mean General
Memory Index as measured with the Wechsler Memory
Scale-Revised (WMS-R) was 79, with an Attention Index
of 101. A Delayed Memory Index of 58 in the patient
group was indicative of their severe memory deªcits.
Details concerning individual patients, and separate
means for the Korsakoff and non-Korsakoff patient sub-
groups, are presented in Table 2.
Materials, Design and Procedure
Materials were selected from the lists of semantic asso-
ciates published by Roediger and McDermott (1995) and
supplemented by Stadler, Roediger, and McDermott (in
press). For the study lists, two sets of six 15-word lists
were chosen, Set A and Set B. For each of the six 15-word
lists, there was a critical nonpresented “theme word” or
related lure on which all the associates converge, and
that is not presented during the study phase of the
experiment (e.g., for the 15-word list containing the
presented words cigarette, puff, blaze, billows, pollu-
tion, ashes, cigar, and so forth, the related lure was
smoke). The two word sets were matched with respect
to the mean false alarm rate to the related lure word for
each list, as indicated by the norms assembled by Stadler
et al. (1997). Half of the participants studied only lists
from Set A, and the other half of the participants studied
only lists from Set B. Over the ªve study repetitions, list
order was manipulated such that a particular list never
occurred in the same position of the six possible posi-
tions. Study words within each list were presented in the
same order each time, from the highest associate to the
lowest.
Participants were instructed to read the study words
out loud and to remember them for a test session that
would follow immediately. Participants began each study
session by pressing the space bar on an Apple Macintosh
Powerbook 5300c computer, after which the ªrst study
list was presented, one word at a time for 3 sec each, in
the center of the screen, which was placed a comfort-
able viewing distance from the participant. There was a
1-sec interval between study words. The six study lists
were presented successively without interruptions. Sub-
jects were told that there would be ªve study-test ses-
sions, all using the same procedure, but were not told
that the study materials would be repeatedly presented
and tested.
Each test list was composed of 36 words. Six of these
words were related lures (the nonpresented theme
words). Eighteen of the tested items were studied words,
with three studied words selected from input positions
1, 8, and 10 of each list. Twelve of the tested words were
unrelated lures that had not been presented at study. For
Schacter et al.     677the ªrst test list, six of the unrelated lures were related
lure words for the word set (Set A or Set B) that had not
been presented to a particular subject (thus, for example,
for a subject who was never exposed to the list of words
including cigarette, puff, blaze, billows, pollution, ashes,
cigar, and so forth, smoke constituted an unrelated lure
word). The other six unrelated lures were taken from
position 6 of the lists to which the subject had not been
exposed (e.g., ashes). Analyses of false alarm rates to
these two different types of unrelated lure words indi-
cated no signiªcant differences between them or inter-
actions with subject group (Fs < 2.11), so the two types
of unrelated lures were treated as a single category in all
experimental analyses.
To obtain an estimate of the unrelated lure false alarm
rate after the ªrst test, it was necessary to use new words
that had not been previously studied or tested in the
experiment. Thus, for each of the subsequent four test
lists we chose six related lures and six words from
position 6 of Roediger and McDermott (1995) word lists
that were not otherwise studied or tested in this experi-
ment. These unrelated lures were randomly assigned to
a particular test and were always tested following the
same study lists. Following this procedure, all unrelated
lures for each recognition test appeared only on that test;
no unrelated lures were repeated.
The order of test words was randomized for each test
list, with the constraints that no more than three words
from a single study list appeared consecutively, that no
more than three words of a particular type (studied
word, related lure, unrelated lure) appeared consecu-
tively, and so that no more than three words requiring a
correct response of either Yes or No appeared consecu-
tively. Test words were presented visually in the same
font and size as at study and were shown until the
participant responded. A reminder of the key assign-
ments for the recognition response was presented at the
bottom of the computer monitor for the duration of the
recognition testing.
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